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ABSTRACT
This article investigates corruption pressures at the sub-national
government level by employing a novel approach of empirically
assessing the subjective opinions of local councillors about cor-
ruption risks they have been exposed to. Based on the large sur-
vey data collected in 14 European countries we provide evidence
that individual perceptions of corruption risk experienced by local
councillors are formed by their personal characteristics, where
educational attainment stands as the most significant deterrent to
corruption risk. The comparative assessment of non-transition and
post-transition countries (PTCs) shows that respondents from
PTCs exhibit higher levels of perceived corruption pressures on
the local government level (PCL). In non-transition countries,
councillors in the local government units with more fiscal power
are more exposed to corruption. When government effectiveness
is included, the effect of transition process and local fiscal decen-
tralisation loses significance. Government effectiveness appears to
be a strong tool to alleviate the corruption pressure at the local
government level, in particular for younger councillors in PTCs
The findings shed more light on the issues of corruption, which is
a striking problem at the sub-national government level in the
E.U. Policy implications and suggestions for future research
are offered.
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Corruption hinders economic, political and social development and restrains the
availability of public goods and services (OECD, 2014). World Bank estimations indi-
cate that corruption costs are about to reach 2% of the global GDP (World Bank,
2017) showing clearly its large negative effect on private and public finances. Recent
estimates of both direct and indirect annual corruption costs in the E.U. vary from
considerable EUR179 billion to EUR990 billion (European Parliament Research
Service, 2016).
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The E.U. institutions identified the problem of corruption at the local government
level in the E.U. member states and elaborated anti-corruption policy recommendations
to tackle this issue. Resolution on rights and duties of local and regional elected repre-
sentatives regarding the risk of corruption (Council of Europe, 2016) call for imple-
mentation of good governance, more transparency, promotion of ethical standards and
anti-corruption awareness, preventive measures and stronger monitoring mechanisms.
Several policy measures address the integrity of local and regional politicians, advocat-
ing that local councillors should be better informed and aware of the code of conduct
in order to improve performance of their public duties. Besides proposed measures are
too vague to provide effective remedies for corruption threatening local politicians and
officials, they are not taking into account the contextual factors which may hinder or
support the successful implementation of the anti-corruption policy at the local level.
Community specifics and individual characteristics might play a key role in under-
standing context-related preconditions to effectively fight corruption.
The main goal of the article is to assess the subjective opinions on corruption pres-
sures at the sub-national government level, specifically what factors affect the corrup-
tion perceptions of local councillors.
We have run a multiple regression analysis to test the hypothesis that a council-
lor’s perception of the corruption risk he/she has been exposed to depends on his/her
personal characteristics and on a set of external factors from the institutional environ-
ment in which he/she operates.
The empirical analysis of 14 European countries offers plausible answers to the set
of research questions. Are there variations in opinions of councillors in different
groups of European countries, depending to the institutional status of a non-transi-
tion or post-transition country? Namely, if perceptions of corruption risk experienced
by local councillors are formed by the factors other than personal characteristics, it is
reasonable to assume that their subjective notion of corruption risks may vary
because councillors in ‘old’ European countries and in post-transition European
countries operate in the different environments where concepts of corruption differ
(Graycar, 2015). Further, what is the relationship between corruption at the local level
and fiscal decentralisation, as well as its relation to the overall government perform-
ance in the country?
Our contribution to the literature on corruption is two-fold. It fills the gap in the
rather scarce research on the perceptions of corruption of individuals engaged in the
local government. The empirical study investigates corruption pressures specifically at
the sub-national government level by offering comparative assessment of non-transi-
tion and post-transition European countries. It adds value to the research on local
government topics related to post-transition European countries or published by
authors originating from Central and Eastern European countries that are underre-
presented but gaining relevance in the academic literature (Swianiewicz &
Kurniewicz, 2019). In addition, this research as a measure of corruption uses individ-
ual data on attitudes of local councillors towards corruption at the local level. Finally,
it sheds more light to the corruption that is a striking ‘major problem’ at local or
regional level in the EU, as of opinion of 75% of European citizens (European
Commission, 2014).
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The article is structured as follows. In the next section we provide a brief literature
review to help in conceptualising the research. In the third section we describe the
data and methodology used in our model. In the fourth section we present results of
the regression models and explain our findings. The article ends with final conclu-
sions and policy implications.
2. Literature review
The devastating effect of corruption to national economies or particular sectors has
been confirmed in numerous empirical studies over the last two decades (for review,
see Dimant & Tosato, 2018). However, the literature is less straight-forward in study-
ing corruption at the local level. Some studies came to conclusion that moderate cor-
ruption helps in reducing red tape and in avoiding administrative barriers thus
facilitating doing business in the case of inefficient regulations and overwhelming
bureaucracy (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013; Leff, 1964; Mallik & Shrabani, 2016), and
this might be before all valid for local administration. Meon and Weill (2010) found
that corruption is less harmful or even positively related to efficiency in countries
with underdeveloped and ineffective institutions. Nevertheless, considering corruption
as ‘grease in the wheels’ is extremely dangerous because corruption is contagious and
fast penetrating in all segments of economy and society and its multiplying negative
effects are deteriorating not only business but the quality of everyday life of citizens
so combating corruption has positive effects to economic development (d’Agostino
et al., 2016; Kaufmann & Wei, 2000). Corruption and other forms of malfeasance and
unethical behaviour erode trust in government, institutions and other people and this
negative effect is stronger in transitional democracies (Kostadinova & Kmetty, 2019).
The political and economic legacy of communism boosted corruption in the transi-
tion process and empirical evidence of the size and causes of corruption in transition
(Goorha, 2000; Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005) supports the path-dependency roots of
corruption practices in post-transition. However, if during the decades of transition
progress, the country has improved institutional framework and government per-
formance to the point it limits the opportunities for corrupt deals, this might erase
the past corruption prevalence in post-transition. Local councillors in post-transition
countries (PTCs) might be more sensitive to ‘historically present’ corruption pressures
(Goorha, 2000).
Corruption is defined as a misuse of public office for private gain (World Bank,
1997; Huther & Shah, 2000; Philp, 2016). This formal definition is an umbrella for
many of different types of corruption and dishonest behaviour (see for example,
Andvig et al., 2001; Bussell, 2015; Rose, 2018; Rose-Ackerman, 1999, 2006). What is
considered corruption from the individual point of view largely varies depending on
the social and political environment, public awareness, culture, tradition and other
contextual factors (Jain, 2001). There is a consensus in the academic literature that
individual data on micro-levels are better measuring either perceived or actually expe-
rienced corruption than aggregate indices (Kostadinova & Kmetty, 2019). The indi-
vidual subjective perception of corruption might not correspond to the general
public’s conception of corruption, i.e., to what the concept of political corruption
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means to the public, and how members of the public use the term political corrup-
tion (Navot & Beeri, 2017). Therefore, it is important to assess the corruption percep-
tions as a subjective norm and here the qualitative research offers sound empirical
base for exploring corruption perceptions (Jensen et al., 2007; Reinikka &
Svensson, 2006).
Personal subjective opinions on prevalence of corruption form perceptions of cor-
ruption, in contrast to the real, experienced corruption (Kostadinova & Kmetty,
2019). Perceptions are usually much higher than experiences (Miller, 2016), partly
due to the underreporting of corruption as a criminal activity.1 However, both per-
ceived and actual corruption may have serious political and economic consequences.
Lucic, Radisic and Dobromirov (2016) show that there is negative correlation between
corruption and GDP, which is particularly emphasised in the medium term.
Corruption is associated to weak institutions and poor performance of the public
sector (Dimant & Tosato, 2018; Tanzi 1998). The negative effects of corruption are
considered more evident and even more harmful at the local level. Charron et al.
(2014) showed differences in the quality of government across European regions,
both at national and sub-national levels and these variations are partly due to the
prevalence of corruption. Recent studies of various forms of corruption at the local
level of the European countries showed the prevalence of corruption at the local level,
including nepotism, preferential allocation of public contracts by public procurement,
favouritism, abuse of power, and conflict of interest, so corruption is affecting the
effectiveness of public services in the E.U. and the E.U. periphery (Tromme &
Volintiru, 2018). European Anti-Corruption report identifies corruption at the local
level as one of the specific risk areas: ‘Corruption risks are found to be higher at
regional and local levels where checks and balances and internal controls tend to be
weaker than at central level … wide discretionary powers of regional governments or
local administrations (which also manage considerable resources) are not matched by
a corresponding level of accountability and control mechanisms. Conflicts of interest
raise particular problems at the local level (European Commission, 2014, p. 16).
Within the E.U., new member states that have gone through the process of transition
to market economy, struggle with corruption more than ‘old’ E.U. member states
(European Parliament Research Service, 2016). In general, corruption in the E.U.
institutions is mostly discussed and perceived as a new member states problem raised
within the process of accession and usage of the E.U. funding. An increased public
interest in the issue of corruption and international organisations’ anti-corruption
rhetoric for East European countries in early 2000 is observed by Grigorescu (2006).
Past research provides arguments that corruption at the local level is more pro-
nounced if compared to the corruption at the national level (Habibov et al., 2019).
Although some studies aimed to quantify corruption at the local level (e.g.,
Linhartova & Volejnıkova, 2015), the incidence of corruption belongs to dark num-
bers and measuring the corruption prevalence at national and sub-national level
remains highly subjective. Therefore, the reasoning of higher corruption risk at the
sub-national level stems from the argument that local bureaucrats have more discre-
tionary power and are more difficult to be controlled (Kwon, 2014; Loftis, 2015;
Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1995). If motivated by personal benefits, the decisions of
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corrupt politicians and administration often collide with the public interest of local com-
munity. Public funding is used to finance projects of particular self-interest and budget
spending is lacking transparency (Dzhumashev, 2014; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). In cor-
rupt societies and communities, government priorities do not enhance development and
economic policy is inefficient (d’Agostino et al., 2016; Kaufmann & Wei, 2000).
Habibov et al. (2019) link corruption and satisfaction with government perform-
ance on local and national level. More concretely, they find that corruption lowers
the level of satisfaction with local and national government, but also indicate that
there is a stronger negative effect of corruption in local than in national government.
There is a close negative link between two different phenomena, corruption and gov-
ernment efficiency (Mohamadi et al., 2017) where efficient governments act transpar-
ently and perform well by not wasting resources or imposing burdensome regulations
(Lee & Whitford, 2009; Schwab & Sala-i-Martın, 2015). Government performance is
evaluated by the government effectiveness as well; citizens who are not satisfied with
providing services by formal institutions will turn to informal institutions and corrupt
transactions (Beck & Laeven, 2006).
Corruption at the local level might raise different issues compared to the effects on
the national level (Gonzales de Asis, 2006). Local government employees might be
more dependent or influenced by politicians and interest groups so anti-corruption
mechanisms are not working properly at the local level (Prud’homme, 1995). In line
with the rent-seeking theory of monopolistic government agent (Goorha, 2000), an
increased discretion power and financial responsibilities due to the decentralisation
increase corruption pressures (see more in Slijepcevic et al., 2018).
The literature analysing the nexus between the decentralisation and corruption
brings different conclusions. Political decentralisation that increases citizens’ partici-
pation does not reduce bribery in post-communist context (as of empirical study of
minorities in Western Balkan countries by Skendaj (2016)). Transferring funds and
tasks to weak local governments could even lead to rising pressures on local units
and their greater exposure to corruption that is not always beneficial from an effi-
ciency standpoint of view (Prud’homme, 1995). World Bank study on transition
countries is pointing out that ‘… in countries where the accountability and capacity
of sub-national governments is weak and there are few safeguards against the
manipulation of municipal assets and enterprises for the private gain of local officials,
decentralisation can actually increase corruption, bias resource allocation, and
adversely affect access and quality in basic social services’ (World Bank, 2000, p. 55).
The reasoning behind these opposite arguments is explained by different factors.
Some models employ a degree of fiscal decentralisation (Alfano et al., 2014) or type
of decentralisation (Fisman & Gatti, 2002b; Goel & Nelson, 2011; Miri et al., 2016) as
well as degrees of monitoring of bureaucrats and freedom of the press (see more in
Lessman & Markwardt, 2010). Neudorfer and Neudorfer (2015) argued that the allo-
cation of power to sub-national levels of government creates opportunities for cor-
ruption so the strong regional self-rule as the consequence of decentralisation
enhances political corruption.
Despite the existing body of knowledge suggests there is a valid reason to explore
corruption and fiscal decentralisation nexus by including individual characteristics of
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local government participants (local councillors) in the model, this assessment is lack-
ing in the available literature. Our research takes into account this perspective, and
more details on the variables are provided in the following section.
3. Data description and methodology
This empirical study uses the part of the original data from the survey conducted
among councillors at the second-tier level in 14 European countries:2 Belgium,
Croatia, Czech Republic, England, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway,
Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden. The survey target population was 40,877 coun-
cillors at the second level of government, and the final sample totals 5,134 councillors
(12.6% of target population). The response rate was between 1.9% in Poland and
70.7% in Sweden (Figure 1).
To test our research hypothesis, we developed the model with perceived corruption
at the local government level (PCL) as a dependent variable. Here we used the particular
survey questionnaire item measuring the subjective notion of the corruption pressure to
each individual respondent, local councillor. Individual attributes of respondents in
terms of gender, age and level of education attained are used as the explanatory variables
in the model, as well as the level of fiscal decentralization (LFD) of a country, indicator
of government effectiveness and a dummy variable denoting PTCs (Table 1).
Source: Authors.
An average age of a local councillor is around 52, and persons with tertiary educa-
tion attained are here considered as highly educated. All the responses recorded in
the survey conducted in one of the five PTCs (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania) refer to the local councillors in the post-transition group, differen-
tiating to other local councillors originating from non-transition European countries.
Figure 1. Survey sample.
Source: Authors.
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An average local councillor in European country does not see fraud or corruption
as an increasing threat to the efficacy of the local government. The average score for
PCL variable is 2.85 on the scale from 1 to 5, denoting the level of slight disagree-
ment to that statement (Table 1). The expressed disagreement implies the perceived
increasing trend of corruption: in the very corrupt environment where corruption
pressures are widespread and stable, the evident fraud and corruption risks at the
local level are not increasing but persistently high. Increased media coverage and gen-
erally increased awareness of corruption problem, raise perceptions of corruption as a
widespread phenomenon (Grigorescu, 2006). This might in particular be the case of
new democracies and post-transition societies with poor governance and deficient
institutional framework that is still too weak to support local development and gov-
ernment effectiveness (Uberti, 2018).
The PCL variable as a measure of corruption pressure bridges two concepts of cor-
ruption measures and thus brings novelty to the body of knowledge. Usually, individ-
ual experienced corruption measure corruption between citizens or business people in
their transactions with public officials and mostly reflect petty (administrative) cor-
ruption. In contrast to the ‘individual’ level, grand (political) corruption is widespread
at the societal level (Kostadinova & Kmetty, 2019). Our research assesses corruption
in combination, i.e., between these two levels taking as a measure of corruption per-
ceptions of corruption prevalence taken from individuals who are engaged in the
local government. Despite the fact that PCL indicates the subjective point of view of
Table 1. List of variables.
Code Variable Possible values Source
PCL Perceived corruption at







1 – Strongly disagree
2 – Disagree
3 – Neither agree nor
disagree
4 – Agree




GEN Gender 0 – Women
1 – Men
Survey
AGE Age Min ¼ 23 years, max ¼




EDU Education 0 – Primary and secondary
education
1 – Tertiary education
Survey
LFD Level of fiscal
decentralisation
Min ¼ 6.7%, max ¼
47.8%, mean ¼ 25.2%;
standard deviation: 14.0
OECD, www.oecd.org
For Croatia: Ministry of
Finance of the Republic
of Croatia, www.mfin.hr
PTC Post-transition country 0 – No
1 – Yes
EBRD, www.ebrd.org
GEF Government effectiveness Min ¼ -0.03, max ¼ 1.83,
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individuals holding a position in local government, opinion that corruption presents
an increasing threat to the efficacy of local government is not common to all the
councillors. Therefore, it would be of the particular interest to determine what factors
stand behind the differences in individual opinions.
The subjective notion of local councillors regarding corruption pressures might
vary depending to their individual attributes; older councillors might have more
experience that prevents them to act as a target for rent-seeking agents; or they might
build more integrity during their lifetime. Nevertheless, it might stand just the oppos-
ite for the younger generations of local councillors who might be more anti-corrup-
tion aware and might better spot rising risks to their work, and variable AGE depicts
this personal characteristic of local councillors. Further, one would suppose that
higher education level (EDU) suppresses the corruption risk, by raising the awareness
of the detrimental effects of corruption at one side, and the importance of the duty
and personal integrity of local councillor on the other side. Past research on educa-
tion and corruption nexus indicated that in societies with low prevalence of corrup-
tion, education attainment increases institutional trust and that ‘effect of education is
conditional upon the pervasiveness of public sector corruption’ (Hakhverdian &
Mayne, 2012, p. 747). Luo and Duan (2016) showed in case of China there was a link
between individual characteristics of local officials and regional corruption incidence
whereas higher education, seniority and experience of local officials made them more
anti-corruption oriented. As Mangafic and Veselinovic (2020) showed for Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the higher educated individuals will more likely engage in bribing.
Education and corruption relation are nevertheless not clear and there is a lack of
empirical studies at the micro-level (Torgler & Valev, 2006).
We include the gender of local councillor (GEN) as a variable in the model since
some studies indicate women are less prone to bribing (Fisar et al., 2016), female politi-
cians are more risk averse (Barnes & Beaulieu, 2019) and less corrupt than men (Rivas,
2013) or at least, more aware of corruption (Frank et al., 2011; Swamy et al., 2001). As
far as it concerns gender – corruption nexus in political arena, findings are not straight-
forward. Debski et al. (2018) showed female participation in politics is not directly
related to less corruption, while other studies showed that more women members of the
parliaments are related to less corruption (Dollar et al., 2001). In their recent study of 17
European countries, Jha and Sarangi (2018) argued that women’s presence in local gov-
ernments is negatively related to corruption. It leads us to assume the subjective atti-
tudes regarding corruption pressures at the local level might be gender sensitive as well.
Individual characteristics of local councillors might become less important to their
subjective notion of fraud and corruption pressures if a person works in the environ-
ment of weak institutions, or in more or less wealthy local government.
The role of local government has been changing and the responsibilities of sub-
national governments in large number of cases are expanding. Local units are getting
more important tasks in providing public goods and services to citizens, and they dis-
pose with greater financial resources (Governatori & Yim, 2012). Delegated responsi-
bilities often go hand in hand with increased discretionary power which is in turn
associated to higher corruption risk (Kwon 2014; Loftis 2015; Prud’homme, 1995;
Tanzi 1995). The financial strength of the local environment, both business and local
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government might be tempting for corrupt agents. The LFD is used as a proxy for
the fiscal power of local government. In the last few decades, European countries
have implemented, at least partly, decentralisation reforms. The analysed countries
differ a lot in the LFD measured by the share of local government expenditures in
total general government expenditures and the large span (from 6.7% to 47.8%) sup-
ports including the LFD as an explanatory variable in the model.
Further, we control for the socialist past of a country, differentiating PTCs from
non-transition European countries. Past research indicates that the extent of corrup-
tion in transition is higher compared to other countries and that determinants of cor-
ruption in transition countries are economic, political and cultural (Iwasaki & Taku,
2012), the latter encompassing the institutional framework and functionality of insti-
tutions. Karklins (2002) offers in-depth insight and systematisation of types of cor-
ruption in post-communist societies (which applies nowadays to PTCs), stressing the
prevalence of state capture, networking and cronyism: ‘de facto take-over of public
institutions for business interests’ (p. 27). Democratisation, good governance, civil
society values, market economy, media freedom, accountability and integrity of lead-
ership both in politics and business and other components of institutional develop-
ment might be lacking in PTCs, and this makes the fertile ground for all kind of
corrupt behaviour (World Bank, 2000).
Finally, in our analysis we include indicator of government effectiveness (GEF).
World Bank defines government effectiveness as ‘perceptions of the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from polit-
ical pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibil-
ity of the government’s commitment to such policies’. Sanchez et al. (2013) showed
that initially government effectiveness is positively related to economic development
and educational status, and governance quality could be improved with better income
distribution, political constraints and some organisational characteristics (e.g., gender
diversity, government size). In that context they claimed that the income is the most
important determinant of government effectiveness in countries with lower economic
development, while in economies in transition it is educational status and finally in
countries with high income level gender diversity. Income levels are positively related
to the level of democracy and negatively with corruption (Kolstad & Wiig, 2016).
The institutional deficiency encourages all kinds of unofficial payments, including
bribery, so ‘many transition economies continue to struggle with corruption in busi-
ness transactions’ (Alon & Hageman, 2017, p. 4). Prevalence of corruption is a vicious
circle so all parts of a society are affected. It means that corrupt public sector inevit-
ably includes corruption in the local government as well. Transition countries have in
common, although to the different degree, an institutional set-up suitable for corrupt
transactions: weak democracies and underdeveloped civil societies, as well as public
administration that lacks integrity and accountability (World Bank, 2000). Attitudes
towards corruption and zero-tolerance of corruption together with other subjective
factors defining soft skills of individuals and values in the society as a whole belong
to the ‘culture’, i.e., to the slow-moving institutions that change very slowly and grad-
ually (Roland, 2004). Due to the culture of informal deals in the communism period,
transition societies might be more prone to corruption (Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005;
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Uberti, 2018). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that transition path might affect
the corruption pressures on local government in our model.
4. Modelling corruption pressure at the local level
In order to examine the determinants of corruption pressures and risks at the local
level, we employ the multiple regression analysis where the dependent variable is per-
ceived corruption at the local level (PCL). Twelve regression analyses were conducted
in total, with four regression analyses for total sample of councillors, four for the
sub-sample of councillors from non-transition countries and four of them for the
sub-sample of councillors from PTCs. The calculated variance inflation factor (VIF)
values range between 1.02 and 1.93, indicating no multicollinearity.
For the whole sample of 14 European countries (Table 2), the regression coeffi-
cients indicate that perceived corruption at the PCL was significantly and negatively
affected by respondents’ EDU Local councillors with higher education attainment do
not see fraud and corruption threatening local government as much as councillors
with lower degree of education and this proves to be equally significant in three mod-
els. Likewise, respondents from PTCs exhibit higher levels of perceived corruption
pressures. Moreover, in the first model, the LFD is a significant determinant of per-
ceived corruption at the local level of government.
Perceived corruption at the PCL is best explained in model 4. When government
effectiveness is included, the effect of transition process and local decentralisation
loses significance. It seems that among post-transition economies in the two decade-
period some countries have reached a higher level of government effectiveness com-
pared to non-transition countries which have poor government effectiveness, namely
Greece and Italy. Other things being the same, women councillors were less likely to
be exposed to corruption. This result is consistent with some other studies which
show that more women engagement in local government is related to less corruption
(Dollar et al., 2001; Jha & Sarangi, 2018; Rivas, 2013).
Our results regarding the nexus between the decentralisation and corruption are
somewhat ambiguous, that is nevertheless in line with past research. While in the first
model the results indicated that the corruption is negatively and statistically signifi-
cantly related with the LFD, the results of the fourth model show that there is no
statistically significant relationship between corruption and fiscal decentralisation and
Table 2. Perceived corruption at the local level of government (PCL), all countries.
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
EDU 0.048 0.040 0.042 0.076
PTC 0.277 0.297 0.298 0.007
AGE 0.014 0.022 0,013
GEN 0.008 0.017 0,033
LFD 0.120 0.023
GEF 0.510












Notes: n¼ 5,134; significant at p< 0.01 level.
Source: Authors.
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that government effectiveness turned to be more important factor. Results of some
studies suggest that transfer of tasks and responsibilities to the local level leads to bet-
ter monitoring of public resources by the voters, and therefore decrease opportunities
for corruptive activities (Arikan, 2004; Fisman & Gatti, 2002a). On the other hand,
some studies indicate that decentralised public-decision making is not an effective
anti-corruption tool (Lambsdorff, 2007). Thus, it seems that a better-quality govern-
ment lowers corruption.
We proceed with two separate analyses, one for non-transition and another for
post-transition European countries.
For non-transition European countries individual characteristics of local councillors
in terms of EDU and GEN are significant determinants of their perceptions of corrup-
tion pressures. Women and better educated councillors have less subjective attitudes
that fraud and corruption have deteriorating impact to the efficacy of local government.
Government effectiveness appears to be a strong tool to mitigate the corruption
pressure of local councillors. For non-transition countries the second main determin-
ant of corruption risk threatening the efficacy of local government is the LFD It
means that councillors in local government units with more fiscal power are more
exposed to corruption, no matter of their individual attributes (Table 3).
Government effectiveness attained during the transition process seems to be the most
powerful mechanism to alleviating corruption pressure at the local government level, in
particular for younger councillors in PTCs. Further results of model 4 for PTCs show
that EDU is negatively related to the perceived exposure to the corruption (Table 4).
When the same model is tested for East European PTCs only, most of the variables
turned to be insignificant. However, model 4 interestingly shows that level of G.E.F.
Table 3. Perceived corruption at the local level of government (PCL), non-transition countries.
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
EDU 0.070 0.056 0.057 0.085
AGE 0.018 0.029 0.030 0.006
GEN 0.017 0.018 0.043
LFD 0.147 0.028
GEF 0.437












Notes: Non-transition countries are Belgium, England, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden;
n¼ 4,314; significant at p< 0.01 level, significant at p< 0.1 level.
Source: Authors.
Table 4. Perceived corruption at the local level of government (PCL), post-transition countries.
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
EDU 0.035 0.028
AGE 0.026 0.021 0.023 0.060
GEN 0.011 0.012 0.012
LFD 0.046 0.057 0.058 0.007
GEF 0.288












Notes: Post-transition countries are Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania; n¼ 820; significant at
p< 0.01 level, significant at p< 0.1 level.
Source: Authors.
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affects the perception of corruption of local councillors (PCL) in PTCs. Age also
turned to be positively related to the perceived exposure to the corruption.
5. Conclusion
Our empirical study contributes to the research of corruption risks that might affect
the efficiency of local government from the particular angle of post-transition East
European countries. The large set of individual level micro-data was tested in the ori-
ginal model and produced results are robust.
The integrity of local councillors or even their resistance to corruption pressure is
as expected, increasing with the level of education attained, and this holds for all
European countries. Further, its gender-sensitivity confirms the arguments of women
being more corruption risk averse (Barnes & Beaulieu, 2019; Rivas, 2013). In contrast
to other studies for transition countries (Luo & Duan, 2016) the new, younger gener-
ations of councillors in PTCs seem to have more anti-corruption awareness, regard-
less of the size of financial capacity of their local community.
Local governments in non-transition countries with more fiscal power have
relieved corruption pressures on local councillors. Conversely, when government
effectiveness is included in the model, the impact of local distribution of authority on
corruption risk is positive. Our findings contribute to the ambiguous literature on
government decentralisation (Fisman & Gatti, 2002a; Neudorfer & Neudorfer, 2015)
showing it is likely to reduce corruption risks where general government is ineffect-
ive. Otherwise corruption of local councillors might be to a smaller extent considered
as grease in the wheels (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013; Mallik & Shrabani, 2016). Our
finding that government effectiveness significantly mitigates the corruption risks faced
by local councillors supports the reasoning of improved overall government perform-
ance as a powerful tool to combat corruption.
From a policy angle, insights into factors driving the corruption pressures at sub-
national level could help in fighting corruption. Given the effect of education in
seizing corruption risks is stronger in non-transition countries, promoting highly edu-
cated councillors of younger generations would bring new anti-corruption standards
into the local government operations in post-transition as well. To that effect, overall
government performance in a country, an institutional framework which would effi-
ciently protect them from corruption risks and the administrative reforms tackling
corruption at the local level in PTCs would make corruption risks less likely. Once
the government effectiveness is satisfactory, more funds could be redistributed to the
local decision-makers because the well-functioning institutional framework will deter
from corrupt rent-seeking. Nevertheless, it takes longer to build integrity of local gov-
ernment – councillors, public servants and politicians. Countries are advised to avoid
transferring power to the local government units that have not proven capacities to
perform. In parallel, strict control should be exercised by institutions over the agents
that are looking to make profit out of re-distribution of local funds and to gain bene-
fits by fraud and corruption, where local voters act as the main corrective mechan-
ism. Recent studies on corruption in East European countries (e.g., Kostadinova &
Kmetty, 2019) suggest the frustration with corruption might provoke citizens’
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reaction in terms of mobilisation and engagement in political activity. This leads us
to conclude on the subjective conception of corruption pressures expressed by local
councillors that might equally affect their behaviour, motivating them to engage more
actively in preforming the tasks in the local government with greater enthusiasm,
effectiveness and accountability.
According to our best knowledge, the study offers unique findings on corruption
at the local level in post-transition East European countries. The limitations of our
research are missing countries in the survey sample, and that perceptions of the cor-
ruption threats we observed should not be interpreted as real fraud and corruption
experienced at local councillors’ position. Our sub-samples of non-transition and
PTCs include different individual countries with numerous local communities and
sub-national governments, each asking for context-specific supporting measures for
implementing efficient good governance practices. Deep-assessment of every country
or local government specifics is beyond the scope of this study. However, it points to
the necessity of further research whose findings will complement one-size-fits all poli-
cies that do not work well in all institutional set-ups and which may not be fully
implemented. Future studies should assess the success of the anti-corruption policies,
and further assess the real corruption experience of local government, which would
enable in-depth analyses of the problem and probably yield more targeted, locally-
specific and practical anti-corruption remedies.
Notes
1. Zaparo (1998) elaborated why public officials do not report corruption.
2. These data were collected in 2013 as a part of a large survey conducted within the project
‘Policy making at the Second Tier of Local Government in Europe What is happening in
Provinces, Counties, Departements and Landkreise in the on-going re-scaling
of statehood.’
Disclosure statement





d’Agostino, G., Dunne, J. P., & Pieroni, L. (2016). Government spending, corruption and eco-
nomic growth. World Development, 84, 190–205. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.03.
011
Alfano, M. R., Baraldi, A. L., Cantabene, C. (2014). The effect of the decentralization degree on
corruption: A new interpretation (EERI Research Paper Series 10). Economics and
Econometrics Research Institute.
3504 S. SLIJEPČEVIĆ ET AL.
Alon, A., & Hageman, A. (2017). An institutional perspective on corruption in transition
economies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 25(3), 155–166. https://doi.org/
10.1111/corg.12199
Andvig, J. C., Fjeldstad, O. H., Amundsen, I., Sissener, T., & Søreide, T. (2001). Corruption: A
review of contemporary research (Technical Report in Report). Chr. Michelsen Institute.
Arikan, G. G. (2004). Fiscal decentralization: A remedy for corruption? International Tax and
Public Finance, 11(2), 175–195. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ITAX.0000011399.00053.a1
Barnes, T. D., & Beaulieu, E. (2019). Women politicians, institutions, and perceptions of
corruption. Comparative Political Studies, 52(1), 134–167. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0010414018774355
Beck, T., & Laeven, L. (2006). Institution building and growth in transition economies. Journal
of Economic Growth, 11(2), 157–186. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10887-006-9000-0
Bussell, J. (2015). Typologies of corruption: A pragmatic approach. In S. Rose-Ackerman & P.
Lagunes (Eds.), Greed, Corruption, and the modern state (pp. 21–45). Edward Elgar.
Charron, N., Dijkstra, L., & Lapuente, V. (2014). Regional governance matters: Quality of gov-
ernment within European Union Member States. Regional Studies, 48(1), 68–90. https://doi.
org/10.1080/00343404.2013.770141
Council of Europe. (2016). Preventing corruption and promoting public ethics at local and
regional levels. Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. https://www.coe.int/en/web/con-
gress/corruption-and-public-ethics
Debski, J., Jetter, M., M€osle, S., & Stadelmann, D. (2018). Gender and corruption: The
neglected role of culture. European Journal of Political Economy, 55, 526–537. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.05.002
Dimant, E., & Tosato, G. (2018). Causes and effects of corruption: What has past decade’s
empirical research taught us? A survey. Journal of Economic Surveys, 32(2), 335–356. https://
doi.org/10.1111/joes.12198
Dollar, D., Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2001). Are women really the “fairer” sex? Corruption and
women in government. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 46(4), 423–429.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00169-X
Dreher, A., & Gassebner, M. (2013). Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and cor-
ruption on firm entry. Public Choice, 155(3–4), 413–432. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-
9871-2
Dzhumashev, R. (2014). Corruption and growth: The role of governance, public spending, and
economic development. Economic Modelling, 37, 202–215. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ-
mod.2013.11.007
European Commission. (2014). EU anti-corruption report. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/
sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/cor-
ruption/docs/acr_2014_en.pdf
European Parliament Research Service. (2016). The cost of non-Europe in the area of organised
crime and corruption. March 2016. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/
2016/579319/EPRS_STU%282016%29579319_EN.pdf
Fisar, M., Kubak, M., Spalek, J., & Tremewan, J. (2016). Gender differences in beliefs and
actions in a framed corruption experiment. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental
Economics, 63, 69–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2016.05.004
Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2002a). Decentralization and corruption: Evidence across countries.
Journal of Public Economics, 83(3), 325–345. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00158-4
Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2002b). Decentralization and corruption: Evidence from U.S. Federal
Transfer Programs. Public Choice, 113(1/2), 25–35. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020311511787
Frank, B., Lambsdorff, J. G., & Boehm, F. (2011). Gender and corruption: Lessons from labora-
tory corruption experiments. The European Journal of Development Research, 23(1), 59–71.
https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2010.47
Goel, R. K., & Nelson, M. A. (2011). Government fragmentation versus fiscal decentralization
and corruption. Public Choice, 148(3–4), 471–490. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9666-x
Gonzales de Asis, M. (2006). Reducing corruption at the local level. World Bank.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA 3505
Goorha, P. (2000). Corruption: theory and evidence through economies in transition.
International Journal of Social Economics, 27(12), 1180–1204. https://doi.org/10.1108/
03068290010378382
Governatori, M., Yim, D. (2012). Fiscal decentralisation and fiscal outcomes (Economic papers
468). European Economy, European Commission.
Graycar, A. (2015). Corruption: Classification and analysis. Policy and Society, 34(2), 87–96.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2015.04.001
Grigorescu, A. (2006). The corruption eruption in East-Central Europe: The increased salience
of corruption and the role of intergovernmental organizations. East European Politics and
Societies: And Cultures, 20(3), 516–549. https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325405276655
Habibov, N., Fan, L., & Auchynnikava, A. (2019). The effects of corruption on satisfaction
with local and national governments. Does corruption ‘grease thewheels’? Europe-Asia
Studies, 71(5), 736–752. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2018.1562044
Hakhverdian, A., & Mayne, Q. (2012). Institutional trust, education, and corruption: A micro-
macro interactive approach. The Journal of Politics, 74(3), 739–750. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0022381612000412
Huther, J., Shah, A. (2000). Anti-corruption policies and programs: A framework for evaluation
(Policy Research Working Paper No. 2501). World Bank.
Iwasaki, I., & Taku, S. (2012). The determinants of corruption in transition economies.
Economics Letters, 114(1), 54–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.08.016
Jain, A. K. (2001). Corruption: A review. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(1), 71–121. https://
doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00133
Jensen, N. M., Li, Q., Rahman, A. (2007, November). Heard melodies are sweet, but those
unheard are sweeter: Understanding corruption using cross-national firm-level surveys (The
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper WPS4413). The World Bank.
Jha, C. K., & Sarangi, S. (2018). Women and corruption: What positions must they hold to
make a difference? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 151, 219–233. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.021
Karklins, R. (2002). Typology of post-communist corruption. Problems of Post-Communism,
49(4), 22–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2002.11655993
Kaufmann, D., Wei, S. J. (2000). Does ‘grease money’ speed up the wheels of commerce?
(International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 00/64). IMF.
Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. (2016). Does democracy reduce corruption? Democratization, 23(7),
1198–1215. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1071797
Kostadinova, T., & Kmetty, Z. (2019). Corruption and political participation in Hungary: Testing
models of civic engagement. East European Politics and Societies: And Cultures, 33(3),
555–578. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full. https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325418800556
Kwon, I. (2014). Motivation, discretion, and corruption. Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory, 24(3), 765–794. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mus062
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2007). The Institutional Economics Of Corruption And Reform: Theory, evi-
dence and policy. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Lee, S.-Y., & Whitford, A. B. (2009). Government effectiveness in comparative perspective.
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 11(2), 249–281. https://doi.
org/10.1080/13876980902888111
Leff, N. H. (1964). Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. American
Behavioral Scientist, 8(3), 8–14. https://doi.org/10.1177/000276426400800303
Lessman, C., & Markwardt, G. (2010). One size fits all? Decentralization, corruption, and the
monitoring of bureaucrats. World Development, 38(4), 631–646. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
worlddev.2009.11.003
Linhartova, V., & Volejnıkova, J. (2015). Quantifying corruption at a subnational level. EþM
Ekonomie a Management, 18(2), 25–39. https://doi.org/10.15240/tul/001/2015-2-003
Loftis, M. W. (2015). Deliberate indiscretion? How political corruption encourages discretion-
ary policy making. Comparative Political Studies, 48(6), 728–758. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0010414014556046
3506 S. SLIJEPČEVIĆ ET AL.
Lucic, D., Radisic, M., & Dobromirov, D. (2016). Causality between corruption and the level
of GDP. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istrazivanja, 29(1), 360–379. https://doi.org/10.1080/
1331677X.2016.1169701
Luo, Y. X., & Duan, L. L. (2016). Individual characteristics, administration preferences and
corruption: Evidence from Chinese local government officials’ work experience. Sociology
Mind, 6(2), 53–64. https://doi.org/10.4236/sm.2016.62004
Mallik, G., & Shrabani, S. (2016). Corruption and growth: A complex relationship.
International Journal of Development Issues, 15(2), 113–129. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJDI-01-
2016-0001
Mangafic, J., & Veselinovic, L. (2020). The determinants of corruption at the individual level:
evidence from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istrazivanja, https://doi.
org/10.1080/1331677X.2020.1723426
Miller, W. I. (2016). Perceptions, experience and lies: What measures corruption and what do
corruption measures measure? In A. Shacklock, C. Sampford, C. Connors , & F. Galtung
(Eds.), Measuring corruption (pp. 163–187). Routledge.
Meon, P.-G., & Weill, L. (2010). Is corruption an efficient grease? World Development, 38(3),
244–259. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.06.004
Miri, M., El Hassan, T., & Ayman, B. M. (2016). Fiscal decentralization and corruption in
emerging and developing countries. International Journal of Economics, Finance and
Management Sciences, 4(4), 211–222.
Mohamadi, A., Peltonen, J., & Wincent, J. (2017). Government efficiency and corruption: A
country-level study with implications for entrepreneurship. Journal of Business Venturing
Insights, 8, 50–55. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbvi.2017.06.002
Navot, D., & Beeri, I. (2017). Conceptualization of political corruption, perceptions of corrup-
tion, and political participation in democracies. Lex localis - Journal of Local Self-
Government, 15(2), 199–217. https://doi.org/10.4335/15.2.199-219(2017)
Neudorfer, B., & Neudorfer, N. S. (2015). Decentralization and political corruption:
Disaggregating regional authority. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 45(1), 24–50. https://
doi.org/10.1093/publius/pju035
OECD. (2014). The rationale for fighting corruption. CleanGovBiz Integrity in Practice. https://
www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/49693613.pdf.
Philp, M. (2016). Corruption definition and measurement. In A. Shacklock, C. Sampford, C.
Connors, & F. Galtung (Eds.), Measuring corruption (pp. 45–56). Routledge.
Prud’homme, R. (1995). The dangers of decentralisation. The World Bank Research Observer,
10(2), 201–220.
Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2006). Using micro-surveys to measure and explain corruption.
World Development, 34(2), 359–370. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.03.009
Rivas, M. F. (2013). An experiment on corruption and gender. Bulletin of Economic Research,
65(1), 10–42. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00450.x
Roland, G. (2004). Understanding institutional change: Fast-moving and slow-moving institu-
tions. Studies in Comparative International Development, 38(4), 109–131. https://doi.org/10.
1007/BF02686330
Rose, J. (2018). The meaning of corruption: Testing the coherence and adequacy of corruption
definitions. Public Integrity, 20(3), 220–233. https://doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2017.1397999
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government. Cambridge University Press.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (Ed.). (2006). International handbook on the economics of corruption, cor-
ruption and government. Edward Elgar.
Sanchez, I. M., Frias-Aceituno, J., & Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B. (2013). Determinants of govern-
ment effectiveness. International Journal of Public Administration, 36(8), 567–577. https://
doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2013.772630
Sandholtz, W., & Taagepera, R. (2005). Corruption, culture, and communism. International
Review of Sociology, 15(1), 109–131. https://doi.org/10.1080/03906700500038678
Schwab, K., & Sala-I-Martın, X. (2015). The global competitiveness report 2015–2016. http://
www3.weforum.org/docs/gcr/2015-2016/Global_Competitiveness_Report_2015-2016.pdf
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA 3507
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993). Corruption. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3),
599–617. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118402
Skendaj, E. (2016). Social status and minority corruption in the Western Balkans. Problems of
Post-Communism, 63(2), 108–120. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2015.1106323
Slijepcevic, S., Rajh, E., & Budak, J. (2018). Analiza izlozenosti korupcijskim pritiscima na
lokalnoj razini u Europi. Ekonomski Pregled, 69(4), 329–349. https://doi.org/10.32910/ep.69.
4.1
Swamy, A., Knack, S., Lee, Y., & Azfar, O. (2001). Gender and corruption. Journal of
Development Economics, 64(1), 25–55. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00123-1
Swianiewicz, P., & Kurniewicz, A. (2019). Coming out of the shadow? Studies of local govern-
ments in Central and Eastern Europe in European academic research. Local Government
Studies, 45(2), 153–174. https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2018.1548352
Tanzi, V. (1995). Fiscal federalism and decentralization: A review of some efficiency and macro-
economic aspects [Paper presentation]. Annual World Bank Conference on Development
Economics 1995, Washington, DC.
Tanzi, V. (1998). Corruption around the world: Causes, consequences, scope and cures. Staff
Papers - International Monetary Fund, 45(4), 559–594. https://doi.org/10.2307/3867585
Torgler, B., & Valev, N. T. (2006). Corruption and age. Journal of Bioeconomics, 8(2), 133–145.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-006-9003-0
Tromme, M., Volintiru, C. (2018). Corruption risks at the local level in the EU and EU per-
iphery countries. OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum. https://www.oecd.org/
corruption/integrity-forum/academic-papers/Tromme.pdf
Uberti, L. J. (2018). Corruption in transition economies: Socialist, Ottoman or structural?
Economic Systems, 42(4), 533–555. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecosys.2018.05.001
World Bank. (1997). Mainstreaming anti-corruption activities in World Bank assistance: A
review of progress since 1997. Operations Evaluation Department.
World Bank. (2000). Anticorruption in transition: A contribution to the policy debate. https://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/contribution.pdf
World Bank. (2017). Combating corruption. http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/
brief/anti-corruption
Zaparo, L. (1998). Factors which deter public officials from reporting corruption. Crime, Law
and Social Change, 30(3), 273–287.
3508 S. SLIJEPČEVIĆ ET AL.
